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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DUE PROCESS-STATE PROCEDURE FOR ATTACKING 
THE COMPOSITION OF GRAND JURIEs-Defendant Michel, a Negro, was in-
dicted by a grand jury for rape on February 19, 1953. On March 2, the 
same day that the term of the grand jury expired, he was arraigned and 
counsel was appointed.1 One week (five judicial days) later, motion was 
made to quash the indictment on grounds of discrimination against Negroes 
in impaneling the grand jury. The trial court ruled that the objection had 
been waived because Louisiana law requires that it be raised within three 
judicial days after the expiration of the term of the grand jury.2 The 
defendant was convicted, and the Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed.3 
Defendant Poret, also a Negro, was indicted for rape on December 12, 
1950, by a grand jury whose term expired in March 1951. He fled and was 
not returned and arraigned until October 1952. In November 1952 he 
moved to quash the indictment on similar grounds. The trial court ruled 
the objection waived and the defendant was convicted. The state supreme 
court affirmed.4 On certiorari, held, affirmed, three justices dissenting. 
l One principal point in the case was whether counsel actually was appointed at this 
time, or, as the defendant contended, three days later, when the attorney received formal 
notice of his appointment. The evidence showed that the counsel was in the court that 
day and had asked for a continuance of the defendant's case and that it was common 
local practice to make appointment without sending formal notice. The state court de-
cided against the' defendant, and the Supreme Court refused to overturn that fact de-
termination without a more substantial basis than counsel's assertion. 
2 La. Rev. Stat. (1950) tit. 15, §202, as interpreted in State v. Wilson, 204 La. 24, 14 
S. (2d) 873 (1943), app. dismissed 320 U.S. 714, 64 S.Ct. 202 (1943). 
3 225 La. 1040, 74 S. (2d) 207 (1954). 
4 226 La. 201, 75 S. (2d) 333 (1954). 
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The Louisiana rule is valid on its face and in its application. Michel v. 
Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 76 S.Ct. 158 (1955). 
Defendant Reece, an illiterate Negro charged with rape, was indicted 
by a grand jury before he was represented by counsel. The grand jury's 
docket did not list him as one against whom a case would be presented. 
Seven days later he moved to quash the indictment on grounds of discrimi-
nation against Negroes in the selection of the grand jury. The trial court 
held such objection waived since Georgia law requires that it be made before 
the indictment is brought.5 The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed.6 On 
certiorari, held, reversed. Whether or not the Georgia rule of procedure 
is valid on its face, its application to the facts of the case deny the defendant 
due process of law. Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 85, 76 S.Ct. 167 (1955). 
It is a well recognized principle of constitutional law that Negroes may 
not be discriminated against in the selection of grand or petit juries.7 
The decision of the Supreme Court in the Michel case does not represent 
renunciation· of this principle, but, rather, adherence to the equally well 
recognized principle that failure to follow prescribed procedure in raising 
an objection results in the waiver of that objection.8 But procedure may 
not be prescribed indiscriminately. In the case of state courts, the limita-
tions are the shadowy reaches of the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Am.endment.9 These bounds defy concise definition and so must be 
marked out empirically, case by case, with particular regard to what is 
fair, fundamental, and necessary to "ordered liberty."1° Consequently, two 
main considerations control each decision, the facts and the philosophy 
of the court which views them.11 The two principal cases are excellent 
5 Williams v. State, 69 Ga. 11 (1882). 
6 211 Ga. 339, 85 S.E. (2d) 773 (1955). A first conviction was reversed on other grounds. 
210 Ga. 578, 82 S.E. (2d) 10 (1954). Before his second trial the defendant again moved 
to quash, and again the trial court held the objection waived. 
7 Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 
74 S.Ct. 667 (1954); 52 A.L.R. 919 at 920 (1928). , 
s "No procedural principle is more familiar to this Court than that a constitutional 
right may be forfeited in criminal as well as civil cases by the failure to make timely 
assertion of the right before a tribunal having jurisdiction to determine it. . . • While 
this Court in its discretion sometimes departs from this rule in cases from lower federal 
courts, it invariably adheres to it in cases from state courts .•.• " Yakus v. United States, 
321 U.S. 414 at 444, 64 S.Ct. 660 (1944). Accord: Herndon v. Georgia, 295 U.S. 441, 55 S.Ct. 
794 (1935); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 73 S.Ct. 397 (1953). Cf. Central Union Telephone 
Co. v. Edwardsville, 269 U.S. 190, 46 S.Ct. 90 (1925). 
9 See Packet Co. v. Sickles, 19 Wall. (86 U.S.) 611 (1873); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 
291 U.S. 97, 1,4 S.Ct. 330 (1934); Scott, "The Supreme Court's Control Over State And Fed-
eral Criminal Juries," 34 lowA L. REv. 577 (1949). 
10 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 at 325, 58 S.Ct. 149 (1937); Hurtado v. California, 
110 U.S. 516, 4 S.Ct. 111 (1884); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 29 S.Ct. 14 (1908). 
See also Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 67 S.Ct. 1672 (1947). 
11 Rarely has the Court looked beyond the facts and held such a state regulation in-
valid on its face. See, e.g., Carter v. Texas, 177 U.S. 442, 20 S.Ct. 687 (1900). The Texas 
Code of Criminal Procedure [now Tex. Code Crim. Proc. (Vernon, 1954) art. 358] pro-
vided that a challenge to the grand jury must be made before it was impaneled. The grand 
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examples of the importance of these considerations. In the first case, the 
majority and the dissent differ on both grounds. The initial disagreement 
is over what the facts prove,12 but the basic difference is in the interpreta-
tion of the concept of due process. The dissent in the Michel case sees 
freedom from discrimination as a right too exalted to be lost by the opera-
tion of a mere rule of procedure, while the majority believes that both the 
freedom-from-discrimination and waiver principles are supported by policy 
factors of equal weight.13 In the Reece case, the Court agreed unanimously 
that the defendant's low mentality and lack of counsel, together with the 
concealment of the indictment, produced a result which was unfair from 
any viewpoint. In both cases it was assumed that the Supreme Court has 
the power to regulate state procedure for attacking the composition of a 
grand jury.14 The differences have been and will continue to be in the 
particular fact situations and in the philosophies brought to bear on these 
situations. 
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jury which indicted had been impaneled before the offense for which the defendant was 
indicted had been committed. Despite such an extreme limitation on the right to chal-
lenge, the Supreme Court in reversing did not declare the provision invalid, but stated 
only that in its application the defendant had been denied a federally guaranteed rig}J.t. 
12 In addition to the question of when counsel was appointed, other vital problems 
concerned the capability of such counsel and the reasonableness of the period of time 
within which objections were allowed. 
13 The dissent implied that there is a class of federally protected rights which are 
excepted from the normal operation of procedural rules. Only very clear and flagrant 
abuses of procedure would justify forfeiture of such favored rights, according to these 
justices. Undoubtedly their determination of the facts influenced their position some-
what, and viewed solely from the standpoint of preventing discrimination such a posi-
tion has appeal. But in so interpreting due process they fail to keep the two conflicting 
principles in proper perspective. Justice Black questions whether a flight such as Poret's 
might not later be held to forfeit the right to counsel or trial by an unbiased judge. 
Michel case at 103. But Justice Clark's majority opinion recognizes the essential inter-
relationship of these two principles by weighing the evidentiary problems which would 
be raised by the passage of five years after Poret's indictment against the effect of the 
alleged discrimination. Michel case at 99. 
14 See Williams v. Georgia, 349 U.S. 375, 75 S.Ct. 814 (1955); 52 A.L.R. 919 (1928); 
Scott, "The Supreme Court's Control Over State and Federal Criminal Juries," 34 IowA 
L. REv. 577 (1949). 
